September 2008

The threat of military strikes against Iran, either by Israel or the United States, remains grave. Tehran continues to pursue uranium enrichment in defiance of UN demands, and Washington pointedly refuses to remove the military option from the table. Former Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz has described an Israeli attack on Iran as “unavoidable” and said in July 2008 that if Iran continues its nuclear program, “we will attack it.” 1

U.S. and Israeli hostilities toward Iran have been exacerbated by the strategic failures of American policy in the Gulf region, which have simultaneously empowered and threatened Iran. The flawed invasion and occupation of Iraq have benefited Iran strategically—the very result White House officials wanted to avoid—but they have also increased Tehran’s insecurities, confronting the regime with large American military bases next door and a huge naval strike force in the Gulf.

Iran’s drive for nuclear capability may reflect both its growing sense of strategic importance and its need for a bargaining chip or potential deterrent against external pressures. As a result Israel and other neighboring states feel less secure, and the United States and its allies appear powerless in the face of Iranian intransigence. The resulting frustration has led some to the false belief that military action can solve the current diplomatic standoff.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has expressed concerns about the Iranian nuclear program but has found no evidence of actual nuclear weapons development. The IAEA continues to conduct unannounced inspections of Iranian facilities. In November 2007, IAEA Director Mohamed El-Baradei reported “good progress” in examining Iran’s past nuclear activities and stated that the agency is able to “credibly verify all enrichment activities” at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility.2 In February 2008 the agency reported that Iran has provided satisfactory answers to past concerns about its nuclear program, with the exception of alleged studies contained in a lap top computer indicating possible high explosives testing and missile re-entry activities.3 In May 2008 the IAEA expressed continuing concerns about the alleged studies but verified that Iran has not diverted declared nuclear material to military purposes. 4

In June 1981, the Israeli Air Force mounted a surprise air attack that destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad. In September 2007 another Israeli airstrike destroyed an alleged nuclear facility in Syria. These strikes are cited as supposed successes in thwarting nuclear programs and as models for possible air strikes on Iranian facilities.

The Osirak Myth

The results of the 1981 attack are often misstated and greatly exaggerated. There is no evidence that the destruction of Osirak delayed Iraq's nuclear program.i In fact, the strikes encouraged the Iraqi government to accelerate its nuclear weapons program.ii
  • Wrong Target–The destruction of the reactors at Osirak was unnecessary because there were no reprocessing facilities there.iii
  • Threat not imminent–The israeli attack on Osirak did not preempt a near-term nuclear threat. According to most estimates, at the time Iraq was a decade away from producing a nuclear weapon.
  • Counterproductive–The air strikes on Osirak actually increased Saddam Hussein's determination to build a nuclear weapon.iv Iraq invested billions of dollars to develop a secret, self-sufficient nuclear program, undermining the value of previously beneficial IAEA monitoring inspectors and cameras at Osirak.v
i. Richard K. Betts, “The Osirak Fallacy,” The National Interest 83, (Spring 2006): 22-25. [BACK]
ii. Dan Reiter, “The Osiraq Myth and the Track Record of Preventive Military Attacks,” University of Pittsburgh Ridgway Center for International Security Studies Policy Brief 04-2 (October 2004). [BACK]
iii. Betts, “The Osirak Fallacy”, 23. [BACK]
iv. Imad Khadduri, Iraq's Nuclear Mirage, Memoirs and Delusions (Toronto: Springhead Publishers, 2003), 82. [BACK]
v. Reiter, “The Osiraq Myth,” 3. [BACK]

 

Pursuing Troublesome Targets

Key components of Iran’s nuclear program, such as the enrichment facility at Natanz, the light water reactor at Bushehr, and the heavy water production facility at Arak, are located hundreds of miles from each other, as this map shows, and would be impossible to estroy with limited air strikes. Some of these facilities have been hardened to withstand all but a direct hit. Link to map >>

Many of Iran’s nuclear facilities are located underground, including gas-centrifuges for uranium enrichment at the Natanz complex.5 U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies do not know with certainty the precise location and vulnerabilities of Iranian nuclear facilities. Attacking Iran’s enrichment facilities would require multiple strikes against many sites.6 It would be extremely difficult to assess the damage inflicted on hidden facilities and impossible to be certain that key capabilities were actually destroyed.

Provoking Iranian Retaliation

Iran has vowed to fight back against the United States if it is attacked. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad described the Iranian forces as “holy warriors fighting in God’s pathway,” and indicated that they would be willing to use suicide bombing.7 If a military confrontation were to spin out of control, American troops might become involved, which could lead to ground combat. A commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards warned the United States that it would find itself in a “quagmire deeper than Iraq” if it carried out a military attack. 8

In July 2008 Iran test fired several missiles, including the new Shahab-3 that is reportedly capable of hitting Israel. Iran has also tested Tor-M1 surface to air missiles purchased from Russia for air defense.9 According to U.S. analysts, the “Tor system ensures reliable protection for government, industrial and military sites and ground troops from all types of missiles, unpiloted aircraft, aircraft bombs, aircraft and helicopters with stealth capabilities.”10

General Mahmoud Chaharbaghi, a senior commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, has said that if Iran were attacked, it would fire 11,000 missiles into enemy positions within a minute.”11 Table 2 below indicates the various types of Iranian missiles and rockets. Most of Iran’s deployable rockets are of short range and would likely be fired against U.S. troops in Iraq and American ships in the Gulf.

Jeopardizing U.S. Troops in Iraq

Iran would likely respond to an attack through proxy strikes against U.S. interests in the region. The easiest target would be U.S. troops in Iraq, as well as U.S. civilian workers and embassy officials.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, a highly motivated force of approximately 125,00012 troops, could activate its links with Iraqi Shiite militias and anti-U.S. forces in Iraq, supplying armaments, and perhaps personnel, for increased attacks against American troops, especially in southern and eastern Iraq. Iranian forces could also retaliate through missile strikes, commando raids, or suicide attacks against U.S. forces based in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, as well as on U.S. naval vessels in the Gulf.

Military operations against Iran would cause the U.S. military to lose whatever security gains have been achieved in Iraq. U.S. military casualties would rise. Logistical support for U.S. forces in Iraq could be disrupted, since the supply chain runs along a heavily traveled route from Kuwait through the heart of Shiite territory in the southern part of the country. The hundreds of trucks that pass through this region every day would be vulnerable to increased attacks, causing further hardship for U.S. troops in the country.

Iran’s response could drag U.S. forces into ground combat with Iranian forces, stretching already overextended Army and Marine Corps units in Iraq and Afghanistan. This could compel U.S. officials to bring back the draft and conscript additional troops.

The potential consequences of a U.S.-led military strike against Iran are so grave that acting U.S. generals have indicated that they would resign if the United States attacks Iran.13

Undermining Democratic Forces within Iran

Air strikes would inflame anti-American anger in the Middle East and in Iran. The resulting increased political tensions would have disastrous political consequences for the millions of Iranians who do not agree with their government's destabilizing policies and rhetoric. Iran's potential evolution toward a more democratic society would be undermined.

Iran is presently caught in an internal tug-of-war between a reform-oriented electorate and a conservative, anti-American, anti-Western clergy that dominates politically. Advocates of reform in Iran have said American belligerence will help the conservatives and rally the Iranian people behind the current regime.

 
Table 1: Armed Forces

Iran could "pose a far better organized and more popular resistance to any U.S. or other outside military attack than Iraq," foreign policy expert Anthony Cordesman testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.† A summary of the Iranian force estimates from the International Institute of Strategic Studies‡:
Active
545,000
Revolutionary Guards Corps
125,000
Army
350,000
Navy
18,000
Air Force
52,000
Paramilitary Forces
40,000
Reserve
350,000

†. Anthony Cordesman, “Iranian Threats and U.S. Policy: Finding the Proper Response” (testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, October 28, 2003) http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts031028cordesman.pdf (accessed on November 1, 2007).
‡. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2007 (London: Routledge, February 2007).

Losing Ground in International Diplomacy

Bombing Iran would cut off the best option for monitoring Iranian nuclear activities. Most of what we know about the Iranian nuclear program comes from IAEA inspectors and monitoring equipment on the ground. At the moment the international community remains engaged with Iran, which is obliged as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to accept inspections from IAEA. Encouraging Iran to stay in the NPT and subject to IAEA inspections is essential to regional and international security.

If attacked, Iran could withdraw from the NPT, eject IAEA inspectors, and use the technology it has acquired to build the bomb as swiftly as possible. Iran's former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani said, "If you take harsh measures, we will hide this program. Then you cannot solve the nuclear issue."14

Article X of the NPT allows a member state to declare that "extraordinary events have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."15 In 2007, the Iranian parliament declared that it would force the government to withdraw from the NPT if the international community cannot resolve the current situation without military force.16

Imperiling Israel

A U.S.-led attack on Iran could pose grave threats to Israel. The Iranian government could step up its backing for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza. Hezbollah used Iranian weapons against Israeli forces during the summer 2006 conflict and proved to be a formidable adversary.17

A military conflict between the United States and Iran could also provoke Iran to attack Israel directly. In September 2007, Iranian officials claimed they have 600 missiles aimed at targets throughout Israel and as well as aircraft that could bomb Israel.18 In October 2007 General Mohammad Ali Jafari of the Revolutionary Guard said, "We will reply to any strike with an even more decisive strike."19

In July 2008 Israeli historian Benny Morris wrote in the New York Times that “Israel will almost surely attack Iran’s nuclear sites.” Because of the long distances involved, however, as well as the dispersal and protection of Iranian sites and the uncertainties of U.S. and Israeli intelligence, it is doubtful that Israeli conventional forces alone would be able to destroy or even significantly delay the Iranian nuclear project. The result, Morris predicted, would be “a ratcheting up of the Iranian-Israeli conflict to the nuclear level,” i.e., Israeli use of nuclear weapons against Iran.20

Table 2: Iran's Missiles°
Type
Quantity
Range
Payload
Shahab-1
Up to 200
300 km
985 kg
Shahab-2
~150
500 km
700 kg
CSS-8
~200 s
150 km
190 kg
Zalzal-1
unknown
125 km.
600 kg
Zelzal-2
unknown
210 km
600 kg
Mushak-160
unknown
160 km
500 kg
Shahab-3
limited
±1,300 km
+700 kg
Shahab-4
prototype
2,000 km
1,000 kg
Shahab-5
under development
~5,500 km
1,000 kg
° Table adapted from James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Iran: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs," http:/cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.htm (accessed November 1, 2007) and Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Missile Capabilities: Long Range Artillery Rockets," the Nuclear Threat Initiative, February 2006, http:/204.71.60.37/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/3367_3397.html (accessed November 2, 2007).
± According to CNS, there is suspicion of improvement on Shahab-3 bringing it to a 2,000 km range.

Many Israeli army officials see war with Iran as inevitable and have been planning for it for several years, according to Iran expert Trita Parsi.21 In November 2006, Ephraim Sneh, then the Israeli deputy defense minister, said that preemptive military action against Iran might be necessary. "I consider it a last resort," Sneh said. "But even the last resort is sometimes the only resort."

Exacerbating the Global Jihadi Danger

The sharp increase in anti-American sentiment resulting from military strikes against Iran could lead to greater sympathy and support for al Qaeda and anti-Western terrorist groups throughout the region and globally.

Although relations between the al Qaeda movement and the Iranian regime are uneasy, U.S. military strikes against Iran would arouse anger in Islamic communities throughout the world. By attacking Iran, in addition to continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. would be waging war against three Muslim countries. This would give credence to the claims of Osama bin Laden and his supporters and would reinforce the impression that the West is waging war on Islam. The result could be a flood of new recruits for global jihad and additional terror attacks and suicide bombings against Americans and Israelis.

Threatening Oil Supplies

Using military force against Iran would dramatically damage the global economy. Military tensions with Iran have caused oil prices to spike22 on several occasions.

Iranian forces can disrupt oil shipping from the Persian Gulf and drastically interfere with Gulf oil exports. Oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz would be particularly vulnerable.23

A disruption of the oil economy could lead to a sharp global economic downturn. Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz said in April 2006 that Middle East conflict is causing a lack of investment in new oil technologies in the region that would help supply match demand. Further tensions with Iran would exacerbate the situation and continue to push up the price of oil.24

Alternatives to Military Confrontation

1. Continue working cooperatively with European countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council on a diplomatic strategy that includes targeted sanctions and incentives.

  • Focus on keeping Iran within the NPT regime so that international inspectors continue to have access to Iranian nuclear facilities and can report on any prohibited activities.

2. Open comprehensive high-level negotiations with Iranian leaders, without preconditions, to address nuclear nonproliferation, the stabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan and other issues affecting the two countries.

  • Offer concrete incentives to Iran, such as the lifting of non-military sanctions.
  • Provide security assurances in the form of a pledge to refrain from military action against Iran so long as it does not threaten or attack U.S. interests or those of our allies.

3. Link nonproliferation objectives in Iran to broader denuclearization and peacemaking efforts in the region.

  • Facilitate conversation on a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.
  • Support negotiations for a regional zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Foregoing the military option is not a concession to Iran but a recognition of political reality. Diplomacy is the only option. Bombing Iran would be an act of political insanity, gravely undermining security in the region and beyond. If the Iraq experience has taught us anything, it is that additional military confrontation in the Gulf will bring failure, not success. Instead the United States should engage with countries in the region to seek cooperative and realistic security solutions.

 

Notes

1. Tim Butcher, “Israel threatens war on Gaza and Iran,” Telegraph, 6 June 2008. (accessed August 14, 2008). [BACK]

2. Ariane Bernard and Elaine Sciolino, “Nuclear Agency Says Iran Has Improved Cooperation,” The New York Times, 23 November 2007, A14. [BACK]

3. International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, report by the Director General, GOV/2008/4, Vienna, 22 February 2008. [BACK]

4.International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, report by the Director General, GOV/2008/15, Vienna, 26 May 2008. [BACK]

5.Paul Brannan and David Albright, "ISIS Imagery Brief: New Activities at the Esfahan and Natanz Nuclear Sites in Iran," Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, April 14, 2006. [BACK]

6. David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire, “Can military strikes destroy Iran’s gas centrifuge program? Probably not,” Institute for Science and International Security, ISIS Report, 7 August 2008, 1-2. [BACK]

7.Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Ahmadinejad: US Sanctions against Iran will fail,”
October 30, 2007. [BACK]

8. Fredrik Dahl, “Rhetoric heats up in nuclear standoff; Islamic state warns U.S.
not to attack,” Reuters News Service, printed in The Globe and Mail ( Toronto), November 1, 2007. [BACK]

9. Farhad Pouladi, “ Iran Test-Fires Russian Air Defense Missiles,” Agence France-Presse, February 7, 2007. [BACK]

10. Global Security, “Military: 9K331 Tor,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/sa-15.htm. [BACK]

11. Mark Weiss, “ Iran: We can fire 11,000 rockets in a minute,”
The Jerusalem Post, October 20, 2007, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1192380605161&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter (accessed November 2, 2007). [BACK]

12. Global Security, “Military: Pasadaran,” Global Security http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran.htm (accessed October 31, 2007). [BACK]

13. Michael Smith and Sarah Baxter, “US generals ‘will quit’ if Bush orders Iran attack,”
The Times ( UK), February 25, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article1434540.ece (accessed November 2, 2007). [BACK]

14. Ali Laranjani is quoted in "Iran threatens to end UN contacts" BBC News, April 25, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east
/4941438.stm (accessed November 2, 2007). [BACK]

15. The text of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is available online at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm (accessed November 2, 2007). [BACK]

16. "Q&A: Iran and the nuclear issue," BBC News, October 29, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4031603.stm (accessed November 2, 2007). [BACK]

17. Robert Grace and Andrew Mandelbaum, "Understanding the Iran-Hezbollah Connection," United States Institute of Peace Briefing (September 2006) http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0922_iran_hezbollah.html (accessed October 29, 2007). [BACK]

18. Herb Keinon, "Jerusalem downplays Iranian threat to fire 600 missiles," The Jerusalem Post, September 18, 2007. [BACK]

19. Ewen MacAskill and Fred Attewill, "Iran warns it would strike back against force," The Guardian, October 26, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,2199855,00.html (accessed November 21, 2007). [BACK]

20. Benny Morris, “Using Bombs to Stave Off War,” The New York Times, 18 July 2008, A 18. [BACK]

21. Trita Parsi, "Iran and Israel: the avoidable war," Middle East Policy 14, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 79. [BACK]

22. “ Iran tension leads to oil price high,” Middle East Economic Digest 51, no. 14 (April 6, 2007): 10. [BACK]

23. Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., James Phillips and William Schirano, "Countering Iran's Oil Weapon," Heritage Foundation (November 13, 2006), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Iran/bg1982.cfm. [BACK]

24. Frank Hornig and Georg Mascolo, interview with Joseph Stiglitz, "The War is Bad for the Economy," Der Spiegel magazine, April 5, 2006. [BACK]

This report is a publication of the Fourth Freedom Forum, Goshen, Indiana.
For more information, contact Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf at lgerber-stellingwerf@fourthfreedom.org or call 800.233.6786, ext. 22.

Destroying Security